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28 and US and its allies in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. All of these counterinsurgencies provide valuable lessons that, when applied to the entire spectrum of operations, will ensure airpower dominance well into the future.
WHAT ARE THE LESSONS FROM USING AIRPOWER IN COUNTERINSURGENCIES?
In this type of war … the task is to destroy the effectiveness of the insurgent"s efforts and his ability to use the population for his own ends.
-General Curtis E. Lemay 
Airpower in Decolonization Counterinsurgencies
The first Decolonization era counterinsurgency worth examining took place on . 27 The unsuitability of enclave operations led to yet another strategy, one of search and destroy. Misty FACs gained tremendous tactical advantages, they still did not achieve the strategic advantages desired by the US. The tactical success of the missions in the north, however, did cause North Vietnam to push into South Vietnam which in turn led to the next US strategy, the Demographic Frontier.
The Demographic Frontier strategy was nothing more than the enclave strategy on a grander scale. A group of OSD civilians proposed identifying a region of South
Vietnam that the ARVN and US would defend, leaving the rest of the country to the Viet Cong. The military so objected to the strategy, it was never even suggested to President Johnson. 31 There are no airpower-specific lessons from this strategy other than to highlight the US in Vietnam continued to struggle to find an appropriate use of its military force to achieve its strategic objectives. The same Viet Cong successes from the Tet Offensive that caused the US to consider the Demographic Frontier strategy led to the strategy of pacification.
In implementing the pacification strategy, General Abrams used ground forces to protect the South Vietnamese and disrupt enemy preparations for even the smallest skirmishes. From this perspective, the strategy was very successful, but it did have its disadvantages. The nature of the warfare pushed the Viet Cong back into an insurgency, which limited US technology and firepower advantages. It extended the war, further eroding domestic support just as President Johnson was considering reelection. 32 In an attempt to further peace negotiations, the US stopped all bombing in the north. 33 Again, mixed messages were received by the enemy as the US stopped using one of its most capable coercive instruments, airpower. After his inauguration, President Nixon started planning his strategy to get the US out of Vietnam with honor.
His strategy was Vietnamization.
Vietnamization was about getting South Vietnam to a point it could govern and protect itself after the US had left the region. Unfortunately, President Nixon chose an approach to the strategy that merely worsened conditions resulting from President
Johnson"s pacification strategy. The Nixon strategy entailed US forces protecting South
Vietnam while vastly, yet slowly, increasing the ARVN"s ability to protect their country.
The strategy "…surrendered … military advantages …; failed to use US strength against enemy weakness; it surrendered the initiative to the enemy; its prolongation of the war played to the enemy"s strategy of revolutionary and protracted war; [and] it would do nothing to erode North Vietnam"s war-making capacity." 34 In short, President
Nixon repeated President Johnson"s mistakes of ignoring the strengths of airpower.
The final strategy did not repeat this mistake.
The Although the Soviets changed their tactics (including flying at night as the Stinger was a day-only weapon system), the loss of aircraft shot down by insurgents did play a part in the Soviet"s eventual retreat from Afghanistan. 40 The Soviets also employed MiG-27
Floggers to protect departing convoys and harass nearby insurgents as they left Afghanistan. In response to these attacks, the Israel Defense Force invaded Lebanon in 1982;
its purpose was to secure a buffer zone between their country and those attacking them. This occupation would last eighteen years. 43 In an attempt to further promote (JDAM). The USAF is now developing a precision lethality BLU-129. It will also be manufactured with a carbon fiber casing and low explosive fill; its 500-pound warhead will be mated with Global Position System kits to provide an overpressure kill against soft targets while minimizing blast effects. The effects will be greater than those of the FLM, but less than a traditional JDAM. The success of this low-collateral damage weapon will be a direct result of lessons from earlier technologies and airpower tactics developed while fighting a counterinsurgency. 48 The US would soon have another opportunity to apply airpower; this time in Iraq, location of the second Post-9/11 era counterinsurgency. During its 2006 re-invasion of Lebanon, Israel primarily used its Air Force to defeat Hezbollah"s ability to launch rockets as well as to attack organizational and infrastructure targets. 54 RPAs also had a prominent role in this short operation; they were used by both sides for reconnaissance collection and targeting. Israel was also effective in modifying its radar systems to enable targeting of the low-profile, stealthy
OIF began in
RPAs. 55 After causing considerable destruction and displacing hundreds of thousands of Israelis and Lebanese, Israel withdrew from Lebanon without defeating Hezbollah.
Israel reviewed their lack of success in 2006 with a very critical eye towards airpower. Lessons learned indicated a decline in its military"s ability to conduct joint operations. In some cases, combat brigades no longer had tactical air parties integrated with them. 56 "A look at the historical use of conventional military power against an asymmetric and diffused adversary shows that it is not only air power, but military forces as a whole that are ineffective in this unconventional environment." 57 This is a lesson the US was learning at the same time in OIF, one that would lead to
General Petraeus" surge and focus on training for counterinsurgency operations.
Realizing it needs to train its people in counterinsurgency as well as develop technologies and tactics, the USAF is finally putting appropriate focus on this mission.
In 2007, the USAF published counterinsurgency specific doctrine, Air Force Doctrine These missions will likely continue at the invitation of Iraq and Afghanistan well after combat units have left those countries. In time, these strategic partners will have airpower forces of their own able to protect their own countries, fight counterinsurgencies, and be valuable participants in, and hosts of, coalition training exercises. Ideally Iraq and Afghanistan will be the last of the Post-9/11 era counterinsurgencies, and it will be some time before the US needs to apply the lessons from this era.
Post-9/11 era counterinsurgencies employed airpower in ways that benefited from past eras" lessons. In cases like Afghanistan where ROEs limited airpower, technology was improved and tactics changed to address collateral damage concerns.
RPAs were used in situations that were deadly, dull, or dangerous-keeping the pilot and sensor operators out of harm"s way. RPAs also provided invaluable situational awareness to commanders on the ground. Doctrine and training are finally being developed to better prepare Airmen for supporting counterinsurgencies.
While developing new doctrine and training, it is important to recognize very little literature discusses the use of airpower (in roles other than airlift) during redeployment following counterinsurgencies. Research only found the anecdote of airpower harassing insurgents and protecting convoys while the Soviet army redeployed. As the US leaves Iraq and Afghanistan, it will be critical for airpower leaders to capture their lessons from this phase for use by future generations in later conflicts.
In examining the cases of airpower"s use in a counterinsurgency, the main lessons for today"s and tomorrow"s airpower leaders are to use airpower for: direct attack and CAS, psychological operations, bombing unlimited by ROE (or changing technology and tactics to address ROE limitations), persistent surveillance, and advice.
Direct attack, specifically using precision munitions like Hellfire and laser JDAMs, gives commanders a capability to surgically strike insurgents while causing minimal collateral damage. As long as ground forces are in combat, CAS platforms will be required to protect friendly forces in contact. Psychological operations like media broadcast and leaflet dropping require airpower for localized delivery over target areas.
Counterinsurgencies often require winning the hearts and minds of the local populace.
This cannot be done if civilians are suffering from collateral damage, however airpower advocates should push to restrict bombing ROE limitations because of overly The USAF in recent years has finally recognized the difference in applying airpower in counterinsurgency operations. While still repeating some mistakes from the past, these instances are becoming rarer. Current USAF leadership is responding to OSD demands, joint force needs, and mission realities; recent budget, development, doctrine, and training reflect the changing nature of war and airpower.
"Modern airpower requires an inward focus to operate technologically advanced air and space assets, but irregular warfare calls for an outward perspective that identifies the true nature of an irregular opponent. The paradox of irregular airpower requires today"s USAF to expand its horizons … if it wishes to successfully engage the enemies of tomorrow." 60 With this outward perspective gained from valuable lessons from the past, airpower will continue to be a critical part of counterinsurgency operations.
Endnotes
In addition to lethal and responsive counterinsurgency aircraft, the US should continue pursuing other enabling technologies. RPAs have proven their value in these kinds of operations. The US should field RPAs with endurance times measured in weeks or months. This would decrease crew demands and greatly improve situational awareness. One such example currently in flight testing is the Global Observer; eventually this aircraft will be liquidhydrogen fueled and operate at altitudes over sixty-thousand feet. Aircraft with this capability will need new lightweight, low power sensors that provide the best information to forces on the ground. This will require better intelligence Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination capabilities as well as more efficient datalinks and integrated automated target identification tools.
With better targeting, Airmen will be able to employ weapons in congested areas at risk for civilian casualties. The US should continue developing a family of low-collateral damage weapons for use in these circumstances so ROE limitations like those in Afghanistan may be lifted. An example of such an effort is Special Operations Command"s Stand-Off Precision Guided Munition alternate warhead study for the Griffin short-range air-to-surface missile which
